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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of job complexity and firm as well as CFO-specific 
performance on CFO compensation. We examine job complexity in terms of the intricacies of a 
firm’s operations and whether the CFO serves on the Board of Directors. Accounting and stock 
market rates of return measure overall firm performance while the magnitude and success of the 
CFO’s interactions with financial analysts along with CFO’s use of accounting discretion to 
achieve earnings targets proxy for CFO-specific performance. We find that, consistent with our 
predictions, job complexity and performance (firm and CFO-specific) affect CFO compensation. 
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2 Impact of Job Complexity and Performance on CFO Compensation 
1.  Introduction 
A long line of research has focused on examining the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance measures, i.e., earnings (see Pavlik et al. 1993 for a survey 
of the literature) and stock returns (e.g., Clinch 1991; Lambert and Larcker 1987). The majority 
of the findings are based on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, on the assumption that 
CEOs are the primary decision makers of their firms.  In contrast, with the exception of a few 
recent working papers (discussed in the next section), very few studies examine chief financial 
officer (CFO) compensation.  The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of job 
complexity and overall as well as CFO-specific performance on CFO compensation.   
Traditionally, CFOs were considered to be financial stewards of their companies. Their 
forte was to assemble and present financial statements in a timely and accurate manner.  In the 
past, operational managers, from manufacturing to sales and marketing, dominated most 
decision-making and were the top compensated members of a firm’s executive team.  In fact, up 
until the 2006 SEC rule requiring publicly traded companies to disclose CFO compensation in 
the proxy statement, approximately 20% of the Fortune 500 companies did not even disclose 
CFO pay because CFOs weren’t one of the five highest paid executives (Leder 2007). 
The role of the CFO has changed and arguably has become more challenging over the 
last decade.  In addition to becoming a strategic key partner of the CEO, the CFO of today is in 
charge of understanding and applying the steady stream of new FASB standards and 
interpretations and meeting increasingly stringent SEC regulations including Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) section 302 certification of the financial statements and SOX section 404 internal control 
 
 
3assessments (Sinnett 2007).  As a consequence, nine out of ten CFOs responding to a survey 
conducted for Deloitte Research in 2003 said their jobs had become harder over the previous two 
years (Deloitte 2003).  This increased responsibility has been accompanied by an increase in 
CFO compensation.  A 2008 study by Equilar Inc., an executive compensation benchmarking 
company, found that median CFO compensation increased by 5.2 percent (to $2.9 million) from 
2006 to 2007 while median CEO compensation only increased 1.3 percent over the same 
period.
1   
In this paper, we investigate the effect of job complexity and performance on CFO 
compensation and find that CFOs are not only rewarded based on the traditional measures of 
overall firm performance, i.e., earnings and stock returns measures, but are also rewarded based 
upon other factors measuring individual performance and job complexity.  Using three different 
measures of CFO compensation (salary in year t+1, bonus and total compensation in year t), we 
find our proxies for firm and CFO-specific performance affect bonus and total compensation.
2  
While we do find some significant results on the association between performance and salary, 
the results are much weaker, as might be expected, than those observed for bonus and total 
compensation. On the job complexity side, we find that all three measures of compensation are 
positively affected by the CFO sitting on the board of directors, free cash flow, and issuances of 
debt and equity.  Our other variables measuring job complexity affect one or more but not all 
three measures of CFO compensation.   
                                                 
1  http://www.equilar.com/press_20080529.php  
2  CFO salary is fixed and typically determined at the beginning of a fiscal year.  Consequently, we predict our job 
complexity and performance measure at the end of a given year to impact CFO’s next year’s salary.  Additional 
analysis in section four examines salary contemporaneously measured as the independent variables.  Until that point, 
salary is measured in year t+1 and bonus and total compensation in year t.  For reading ease, the characters t and t+1 
are omitted.  
 
 
4The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section two, we summarize the 
literature and develop our hypotheses. In section three, we describe our sample and research 
method, while section four reports our empirical results. We conclude with a summary of our 
findings in section five.  
2.  Review of Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Prior studies find that executive compensation is related to a number of factors, with the 
foci of research showing that compensation is positively associated with firm performance 
(accounting earnings and stock returns) and firm size. Most of this research focuses on CEO 
compensation.  CEOs are compensated based upon firm performance, as they are ultimately 
responsible for the performance of the entire firm.  Likewise division managers are compensated 
based upon the performance of their divisions, or the contributions of their divisions to the 
performance of the firm (Guidry et al. 1999).  In contrast, CFOs generally speaking, while 
having firm wide responsibilities, are support personnel.  That is, while essential to the 
operations of the firm, they are not the ones who generate the operating profits.  How should 
they be compensated?  In part, as high level executives they should be compensated based upon 
overall firm profitability.  But in addition, we posit that they should also be compensated for 
their role in the overall performance of the firm as well as the complexity of their job.   
We are aware of four papers that have examined CFO compensation, although it is likely 
that others are progress.  Gore et al. (2007) find that monitoring from the finance committee and 
a CEO with a financial background substitute for contractual incentives for the CFO.  Hoitash et 
al. (2007) find that internal control material weakness disclosures are negatively associated with 
CFO bonuses. Using a proprietary survey database of CFO compensation practices, Indjejikian 
 
 
5and Matejka (2008) find a six percent reduction in financial performance contingent CFO bonus 
for public entities in the post-SOX era compared to a three percent increase in comparable 
private companies.  Wang (2005) investigates the impact of the Corporate Governance Reform 
Initiatives on CFO compensation, finding a decrease in the incentive weights on accounting and 
stock return measures in firms with a strong board structure and higher post-Reform CFO salary.  
Job Complexity 
CFOs’ responsibilities have gone beyond merely managing the financial affairs of their 
companies.  Though their job complexity can be evaluated in a variety of ways, we measure it on 
four dimensions: membership on the Board of Directors and intricacy of a firm’s operating, 
investing and financing activities. 
Board Membership 
CFOs serve on the board of directors in about 15 percent of our sample observations (see 
Table 2).  As discussed later, over our sample period we document a declining trend in the 
percentage of CFOs who are directors even though CFO compensation has been on the rise and 
CFOs are expected to provide more help to the audit committee on financial matters in the post- 
SOX era (Sinnett 2007).  The decline is inconsistent with Bhagat and Black (1999) who report 
(in an earlier period) that the board typically included the CFO, but is consistent with the total 
number of inside directors decreasing in recent years, especially in the post-SOX era.   
Prior research has shown that CEOs who also serve as board chairs receive higher 
compensation possibly for the additional work that is required of them (Mallette et al. 1995, 
Sridharan 1996, Core et al. 1999, Conyon and Murphy 2000).  Following this same line of 
 
 
6argument, if CFOs are directors, it is likely that their presence on the board is needed (Hillman et 
al. 2000) to possibly improve the board’s understanding of the financial matters related to the 
firm.   This added importance and responsibility placed on the CFO should result in higher 
compensation.  Consequently, our first hypothesis is as follows:
 3 
H1: CFO compensation is positively related to the CFO serving on the board of directors. 
Operating Activities/Diversification 
Rose and Shepard (1997) examine the association between diversification and CEO pay 
and find that firms pay CEO’s a diversification premia to attract and retain qualified managers.   
In a study investigating the relationship between Director compensation and effort, Adams 
(2003) finds that Director compensation increases with firm diversification.  Following these 
findings for CEOs and directors, we hypothesize a positive association between CFO 
compensation and the complexity of a firm’s operating activities which we proxy for by the 
number of geographical and business segments. 
H2a: CFO compensation is positively associated with the number of geographical segments. 
H2b: CFO compensation is positively associated with the number of business segments. 
Investing Activities 
We expect the extent of a firm’s investing activities to also impact CFO compensation 
and measure it using the firm’s free cash flow and the level of M&A activity.  CFOs employed 
by firms with substantial free cash flow are responsible for investing that money.  Mulford and 
Comiskey (2005) discuss the importance of free cash flow, its link with shareholder value and its 
use in contracting.  Cash rich firms have also been found to be actively involved in diversifying 
acquisitions (Harford 1999).  This increase in M&A activity will directly affect a CFO’s 
                                                 
3 We state all hypotheses in alternative form. 
 
 
7workload.  Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that 39 percent of the acquiring firms in their sample 
cite the completion of a deal as the reason for granting a bonus to their CEOs, with the variation 
in the bonus amount being a significant function of CEO effort and skill in consummating the 
deal. Consequently, our next two hypotheses predict a positive association between CFO 
compensation and the extent of a firm’s investing activities: 
H3a: CFO compensation is positively associated with the firm’s free cash flow. 
H3b: CFO compensation is positively related to corporate acquisitions. 
Financing Activities 
Finally, a firm that needs external capital requires a high quality CFO with credibility in 
the financial markets, e.g., creditors, banks or financial institutions, and credit rating agencies, to 
allow it to raise capital on favorable terms.  The issuance of debt and/or sale of equity will 
require the CFO to file registration statements and deal with underwriters, lawyers, auditors and 
investors.  The next two hypotheses predict a positive relationship between the associated 
increase in CFO quality/workload and CFO compensation. 
H4a: CFO compensation is positively associated with the amount of issued debt. 
H4b: CFO compensation is positively associated with the amount of issued equity.  
Overall Firm Performance 
Perhaps the most consistent result found in the executive compensation literature is the 
positive association between firm performance measures and executive compensation (Lambert 
and Larcker 1987, Sloan 1993, Baber et al. 1996).  Consequently, we hypothesize a positive 
relationship between CFO compensation and firm performance as proxied by both accounting 
and stock market rates of return. 
 
 
8H5a: CFO compensation is positively associated with the return on assets. 
H5b: CFO compensation is positively associated with the return on firm’s stock price.  
CFO-Specific Performance 
The final set of hypotheses focus on CFO-specific performance, which we gauge based 
on CFO’s interactions with financial analysts along with CFO’s use of accounting discretion to 
achieve earnings targets.  Arguably, the CFO is the primary individual responsible for interacting 
with analysts, both in terms of providing guidance as well as meeting targets set by analysts. 
Consequently, the CFO’s compensation should take those interactions, as well as success in 
managing those interactions/meeting targets, into account. For example, the greater the number 
of financial analysts following the firm, the greater is the CFO’s workload. Another measure of 
the CFOs workload/success in dealing with analysts is the number of, or magnitude of analysts 
forecast revisions during the year, as the CFO is expected to be the one communicating firm 
information to the analyst and analysts will be more likely to respond to a high quality/credible 
CFO.   
H6a: CFO compensation is positively associated with analyst following. 
H6b: CFO compensation is positively associated with analyst earnings forecast revisions. 
In addition, we predict that CFO’s compensation is affected by his or her ability to 
manage earnings expectations as well as accounting numbers to meet those expectations.  A long 
line of literature has shown the importance of meeting earnings goals and the steps managers 
take to meet them.  Graham et al (2005) surveyed and interviewed more than 400 executives and 
finds that executives believe that hitting earnings benchmarks, including meeting or exceeding 
analyst consensus estimates, builds credibility with the market and helps to maintain or increase 
 
 
9their firm’s stock prices. CFOs that were interviewed felt that their inability to hit the earnings 
target was seen by the executive labor market as a “managerial failure.”  Supporting this view of 
the importance of meeting targets, Barth et al (1999) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that 
firms incur disproportionately large losses in market value if they miss analysts’ forecasts.  
Unfavorable earnings surprises may also trigger shareholder litigation (Kasznik and Lev 1995, 
Skinner 1994).  Matsunaga and Park (2001) find a significantly adverse effect on CEO annual 
cash bonuses if their firms miss quarterly earnings targets.  In a similar vein, Mergenthaler et al. 
(2008) document severe career penalties in the form of a reduced bonus, smaller equity grants, 
and a greater chance of forced dismissal for both CEOs and CFOs of firms missing quarterly 
earnings benchmarks.   
In contrast, significant economic benefits accrue to both the firm and its executives when 
earnings goals are met.  Bartov et al. (2002) show that firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts 
enjoy a return premium, even when they meet forecasts by managing earnings. Kasznik and 
McNichols (2002) show higher subsequent earnings and market values for firms that meet or 
beat analyst forecasts over multiple subsequent quarters. Balsam (1998) finds that CEOs get 
rewarded for achieving certain earnings goals, even when they are achieved using income 
increasing discretionary accruals.   
Given the concerns over avoiding the negative publicity and stock price reaction, career 
penalties on executives, and the potential loss of credibility and litigation for firms that do not 
meet earnings expectations, it is likely that the compensation committee views the CFO’s ability 
to achieve earnings benchmarks as an important aspect of performance.  Consequently, we test 
the following hypothesis:   
H7a: CFO compensation is positively associated with meeting earnings goals.  
 
 
10Lastly we consider the impact on compensation of CFO’s use of accruals to meet those 
earnings goals.  A good deal of the earnings management literature starting with Healy (1985) 
has focused on the use of accruals to manage earnings, where accruals proxy for the degree of 
discretion in the accounting system.  Geiger and North (2006) find that discretionary accruals 
decrease significantly following the appointment of a new CFO, consistent with the theory that a 
new CFO has significant influence over the firm’s reported financial results.  Graham et al 
(2005) report that CFOs interviewed indicated that they would use accruals within the confines 
of GAAP to reduce the perception of uncertainty about their firm’s prospects and to a lesser 
extent to meet earnings goals.  While the accrual process allows executives to exercise judgment 
in communicating private information about the future prospects for their firms (Healy and 
Palepu 1993, Dechow 1994, Guay, et al.1996, Subramanyam 1996), it also allows them to attain 
specific goals such as avoid debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994) or 
(opportunistically) increase their compensation (Healy 1985, Balsam 1998). 
As a result, we expect that compensation committees are likely to reward the CFO for 
discretionary accruals, when those accruals help achieve firm’s earnings goals.  That is, income-
increasing or positive discretionary accruals can be used to help the firm attain an earnings target 
that would otherwise be missed.  Analogously, income-decreasing or negative discretionary 
accruals can be used to smooth earnings, e.g., build up reserves, and/or lower future earnings 
thresholds.  In both situations, CFO's would be managing earnings to meet firm goals and should 
be rewarded.  Given the two situations provide opposing incentives, i.e., in one case to manage 
earnings upwards, the other downwards, empirically we utilize two distinct variables, positive 
discretionary accruals and negative discretionary accruals.  In other words, using one continuous 
 
 
11variable would not allow us to test whether earnings management is rewarded in both situations. 
To be consistent we formulate the following two hypotheses:  
H7b: CFO compensation is positively associated with positive discretionary accruals when 
those accruals are used to increase earnings to meet earnings goals. 
H7c:  CFO compensation is positively associated with (absolute value of) negative 
discretionary accruals when the firm has already met its earnings goals.   
3.  Research Method 
Sample selection 
Information on CFO compensation is obtained from ExecuComp.  We identify CFOs by 
searching the title field for the strings “CFO” or “Chief Fi”.  We obtain analyst forecast data 
from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S, and financial data from Compustat.  
Using the search string above in ExecuComp, we identify 16,933 CFOs employed by 
2,604 firms over the years 1993-2006.  We eliminate 5,134 observations where CFO tenure is 
less than two years.  We do so because CFO compensation in the first year may be abnormally 
low if the individual is a CFO for less than a full year or abnormally high if the new CFO is an 
outsider and the first year compensation includes a signing bonus or compensation to make up 
for the money forfeited when she left her former employer.  We further lose 1,773 observations 
because of incomplete financial data on Compustat and 614 observations for incomplete forecast 
data on I/B/E/S.  Finally, we eliminate 1,668 observations that either have missing compensation 
data on ExecuComp or belong to firms where there has been a change in CEO, which in turn 
 
 
12may impact CFO tenure and/or compensation.
4  The final sample consists of 7,744 firm year 
observations from 1,786 unique firms.   
Insert Table I about here 
Empirical Model 
We use the following industry fixed effects model to examine the effect of job 
complexity and performance on CFO compensation:
5 
COMP = β0 + β1DIRECTOR + β2GEOSEG + β3BUSSEG + β4FCF + β5ACQ + β6DEBTISSUE 
+ β7STOCKSALE + β8ROA + β9RET + β10NUMEST + β11REVISION + β12BEAT + 
β13PDAxBEAT + β14NDAxBEAT + β15SIZE + β16BTOM + β17SOXDUM + 
β18CEORESID + e  (1) 
where: 
COMP = measure of CFO compensation (log of salary, bonus or total compensation); 
DIRECTOR = 1 if the CFO is a director, 0 otherwise; 
GEOSEG = Log of the number of geographical segments; 
BUSSEG = Log of the number of business segments; 
FCF = Average free cash flow over the past three years, equal to the difference between 
operating cash flows and capital expenditures divided by (t-1) current assets (Dechow et 
al. 1996); 
ACQ = Dollar amount of acquisitions divided by (t-1) sales. Missing values set to 0; 
6 
                                                 
4  For example, Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that ‘‘the probability of a non-CEO leaving office is elevated around 
CEO dismissals.’’ 
5  Unless otherwise indicated, all independent variables are measured for firm i at the end of year t.  Firm and year 
subscripts are omitted for reading ease.   
6  Results remain unchanged if we omit missing values of ACQ, DEBTISSUE and STOCKSALE. 
 
 
13DEBTISSUE = Long-term debt issued divided by (t-1) total assets. Missing values set to 0; 
STOCKSALE = Sale of common or preferred stocks divided by (t-1) total assets.  Missing values 
set to 0; 
ROA = Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
RET =  Annual raw return (includes dividends); 
NUMEST = Log of the number of analyst earnings forecasts for a firm; 
REVISION = Difference between the first I/B/E/S consensus forecast following the year t-1 earnings 
announcement and the last consensus forecast before year t earnings announcement, divided by 
stock price at the beginning of year t; 
BEAT = 1 if actual EPS is greater or equal to the last median analyst earnings forecast before the 
end of year t, 0 otherwise;
7 
PDAxBEAT = Positive discretionary accruals (PDA) times BEAT, where discretionary accruals 
are estimated using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. (1995)).
8  This variable 
equals zero if the discretionary accruals are negative; 
NDAxBEAT = Absolute value of negative discretionary accruals (NDA) times BEAT, where 
discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model.  This variable 
equals zero if the discretionary accruals are positive; 
SIZE = Log of total assets at the beginning of year t; 
BTOM = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity; 
SOXDUM = 1 if fiscal year is 2002 or after, 0 otherwise; 
                                                 
7  Results do not change if we use the last median analyst forecast before the earnings announcement. 
8  We define total accruals as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from 
operations.  We estimate the following model annually using all firm observations in the same two-digit SIC code:   
Total Accrualsi,t = 1(1/Assetsi,t-1) + 2(Sales Revenuei,t - Receivablesi,t)/Assetsi,t-1) + 3(Net Property, 
Plant & Equipmenti,t /Assetsi,t-1) + ei,t 
The estimates ( 1 β,  and  3 β ˆ ) along with actual financial information for the firm are then used to compute expected 





14CEORESID = Residual from a regression model where CEO compensation (salary, bonus or 
total compensation) is estimated using model (1); and 
e = error term. 
To investigate the impact of the test variables, we use three different measures of COMP: 
Salary, Bonus and Total Compensation.  Total Compensation (ExecuComp variable TDC1) 
includes salary, bonus and equity compensation.  CFO salary is typically determined at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, while bonus is paid at the end of the fiscal year.  Consequently, we 
use our independent variables to explain salary in year t+1 and bonus and total compensation in 
year t.
9     
The first seven independent variables measure the CFO’s job complexity.  A positive 
coefficient on DIRECTOR (β1 > 0) would support H1 and be consistent with CFOs being 
incrementally rewarded for serving on the Board. H2 through H4 predict CFO compensation to 
be positively associated with job complexity, which we gauge to be an increasing function of the 
operating (number of geographical and business segments), investing (free cash flow and 
acquisitions) and financing activities (issued debt or equity).  Hence we expect β2 through β7 to 
be positive. 
ROA and RET are our measures of overall firm performance, and consistent with H5a and 
H5b we expect both β8 and β9 to be positive.  The next five coefficients (β10 through β14) test the 
impact of CFO-specific performance measures on compensation.  H6a and H6b predict a positive 
β10 and β11 as we expect CFO compensation to increase with the number of analysts and the 
magnitude of forecast revisions.  Following Graham et al (2005), we use analyst earnings 
                                                 
9  We lose 1,640 observations in the salary regression as the dependent variable is measured in year t+1. 
 
 
15forecasts as the measure of a firm’s earnings goal.  We expect CFOs to be compensated for 
meeting those earnings goals (H7a, β12 > 0), even if they reach those goals by managing earnings 
upwards (H7b, β13 > 0) or downwards (H7c, β14 > 0).
10 
As control variables, we include firm size (SIZE), book to market ratio (BTOM), SOX 
dummy (SOXDUM), and a measure to capture over/underpaid CEOs.  Even though we do not 
formally predict signs on the coefficients of these variables, we expect β15, β17 and β18 to be 
positive and β16 to be negative.  We expect CFO compensation to be higher if they work for large 
and high-growth (low book to market) firms.  For example, large firms typically have a more 
complex structure and require a higher level of managerial effort than do small firms.  Smith and 
Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993, 1995), and Gaver et al (1995) show that firm size and 
growth potential is related to compensation.  Large firms typically have more complex structures 
and require a higher level of managerial effort than do small firms.  In addition, given the 
increase in CFO responsibilities following SOX, everything else being equal, we expect post-
SOX CFO compensation to be higher.  This follows from Wang (2005) that finds an increase in 
CFO salary level relative to COOs (chief operating officers) in the post-SOX era compared to the 
pre-SOX era.  Finally, following Wade et al. (2006) who find that CEOs use their power to 
increase their own salaries as well as those of their subordinates, we expect the degree of CEO 
over/underpayment to positively affect CFO compensation.   
4.  Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
10  Using the absolute value of negative discretionary accruals allows us to predict a positive sign on NDAxBEAT. 
 
 
16Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all variables.   Mean CFO salary over our 14-year 
sample period is $321,041 while mean bonus over this same period is $218,744.  Comparing 
these means to average total compensation of $1,361,713 shows mean cash compensation (salary 
+ bonus) to be less than 50 percent of total compensation.  Even though observations for all 
compensation measures are winsorized at one standard deviation, there are still enough large 
observations to make the median substantially lower than the mean.  This is most obvious in the 
case of bonus where mean bonus is more than one and half times the median bonus. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Roughly fifteen percent of the firm-year observations have CFOs serving as Directors.  In 
unreported analysis, we find that percentage to have substantially decreased, from nineteen 
percent during 1993-2002 to eight percent during 2003-06, which as we noted earlier, is 
consistent with the drop in number of inside directors in recent years.  Sample firms on average 
were profitable over our sample period as evidenced by a 4.5 percent mean return on assets and 
an 18.7 percent mean stock price return.  Mean analyst following was around ten and sample 
firms were able to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts about two-thirds of the time.  Mean 
firm size is over three billion dollars in assets with the mean book to market ratio just under 0.5. 
Table 3 presents both Pearson and Spearman correlations among the independent 
variables.  As expected, many of the variables measuring job complexity and performance are 
correlated amongst each other.  These correlations are relatively low with the largest Pearson 
correlation coefficient being 0.548 between firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (NUMEST), 
indicating that multicollinearity should not be a problem.  We also examined the variance 
inflation factor (VIF).  For the models presented in Table 4, only the VIFs on some industry 
 
 
17controls exceed the acceptable level of 10.  We obtain qualitatively similar results after removing 
those industry controls and running the reduced model. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4 reports the results between the three measures of CFO compensation and job 
complexity and performance.  All three models are highly significant with R
2s ranging from 
56.97 to 66.29 percent.  Among the job complexity measures, all variables except one have the 
expected sign with DIRECTOR, FCF, DEBTISSUE and STOCKSALE significant in explaining 
all three compensation measures.  These findings provide strong support for our hypothesis that 
CFO compensation is positively affected by CFO’s membership on the board (H1), firm’s free 
cash flow (H3a) and debt (H4a) and equity (H4b) issuances. 
Other job complexity measures are significant in explaining at least one of the three 
compensation measures.  Consistent with H3b, ACQ significantly affects bonus and total 
compensation but does not affect salary.  Results are mixed on variables measuring the 
complexity of a firm’s operating activities.  Supporting H2a and H2b respectively, we find the 
number of geographical segments (GEOSEG) to affect total compensation and the number of 
business segments (BUSSEG) to affect salary and bonus.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Consistent with H5a and H5b, we find both overall firm performance measures (ROA and 
RET) strongly significant (p-value < 0.01) in explaining all three measures of compensation.  
 
 
18These findings are in line with firms rewarding their CFOs higher salary as well as bonuses and 
equity grants that are tied to overall firm performance.   
We find all our CFO-specific performance measures to be significant in explaining bonus 
and total compensation, thereby supporting H6a, H6b, H7a, H7b and H7c.  With respect to 
salary, we only find BEAT and PDAxBEAT to be significant.  These results imply that CFOs are 
rewarded with higher salaries for meeting earnings goals, especially if those goals are achieved 
by managing earnings upwards (PDA).  That is, while a negative coefficient on the interaction 
would imply that the CFO is not rewarded for meeting earnings goals through earnings 
management, and an insignificant coefficient would imply the CFO is rewarded equally as long 
as the forecast is met, a positive coefficient implies the CFO gets an extra reward when he/she 
uses earnings management to meet an earnings goal.
11 
Finally, all the control variables are significant in explaining all three measure of CFO 
compensation.  CFOs of larger firms and those with high growth opportunities (low book to 
market ratios) receive higher compensation.  CFO compensation is also higher in the post-SOX 
era as they are being paid more to reflect their increased responsibilities.  Finally, a positive 
coefficient on CEORESID is consistent with over/underpaid CEOs over/underpaying their CFOs. 
Additional Analysis 
Using variables measured in year t to explain year t+1 salary is consistent with CFO 
salary being determined at the beginning of the year and affected by ex ante measures of job 
complexity and performance.  However in some cases, salary can also be impacted by 
                                                 
11  To be precise, if the sum of the positive coefficient on BEAT and the negative coefficient on PDA*BEAT is 




19contemporaneous measures as a CFO can receive a raise during the fiscal year for increased job 
complexity and/or good performance. To examine this possibility, Table 5 presents our results of 
regressing salary measured in year t on contemporaneously measured independent variables.    
Insert Table 5 about here 
Interestingly, the explanatory power of this contemporaneous salary model is higher than 
the three models in Table 4.  Significance on job complexity coefficients is similar to those in 
Table 4 except DEBTISSUE is no longer significant.  With respect to performance, only RET and 
NUMEST are significant.  Insignificance of BEAT and BEATxPDA is consistent with CFOs being 
awarded higher salaries for meeting annual earnings goals in the preceding period.  
5. Conclusion 
CFOs in the post SOX period have more responsibility and attention paid to them than 
ever before.  In this paper, we investigate the effect of job complexity and overall firm and CFO-
specific performance on compensation in hopes of shedding insight on CFO’s rewards and 
incentives.  By focusing on the tasks of the CFO, as well as CFO-specific performance measures, 
we find that CFOs are not only awarded based on the traditional earnings and stock returns 
measures, but are also rewarded based upon other factors. Focusing on constructs not previously 
examined in the literature, we find that CFO compensation is positively associated with job 
complexity and CFO-specific performance.  With respect to job complexity, we find CFO 
compensation to increase with the intricacy of a firms operating, investing and financing 
activities.  CFO compensation is also higher if the CFO sits on the board of directors.  CFO-
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(All variables are measured at the end of year t unless otherwise stated) 
 
Variables Definition   
CFO Compensation 
  COMP – Salary   Log of annual salary 
  COMP – Bonus   Log of annual bonus 
  COMP – Total   Log of total compensation – includes salary, bonus and equity 
compensation (grant date value as determined by ExecuComp) 
Job Complexity 
 DIRECTOR  1 if the CFO is a director, 0 otherwise. 
 GEOSEG  Log of the number of geographical segments. 
 BUSSEG  Log of the number of business segments. 
 FCF  Average free cash flow over the past three years, equal to the difference 
between operating cash flows and capital expenditures divided by (t-1) 
current assets. 
 ACQ  Dollar amount of acquisitions divided by (t-1) sales. Missing values set to 
0. 
 DEBTISSUE  Long-term debt issued divided by (t-1) assets. Missing values set to 0. 
 STOCKSALE  Sale of common or preferred stock divided by (t-1) assets. Missing values 
set to 0. 
Overall Firm Performance 
 ROA  Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
 RET  Annual raw return (includes dividends). 
CFO-Specific Performance 
 NUMEST  Log of the number of analyst earnings forecasts for a firm. 
 REVISION  Difference between the first I/B/E/S consensus forecast following the year 
t-1 earnings announcement and the last consensus forecast before year t 
earnings announcement, divided by stock price at the beginning of year t. 
 BEAT  1 if actual EPS is greater than or equal to the last median analyst earnings 
forecast before the end of year t, 0 otherwise. 
 PDAxBEAT  Positive discretionary accruals (PDA) interacted with BEAT, where 
discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified Jones model.  This 
variable equals zero if the discretionary accruals are negative. 
 NDAxBEAT  Absolute value of negative discretionary accruals (NDA) interacted with 
BEAT, where discretionary accruals are estimated using the modified 
Jones model.  This variable equals zero if the discretionary accruals are 
positive. 
Control Variables 
 SIZE  Log of total assets at the beginning of year t. 
 BTOM  Book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
 SOXDUM  1 if fiscal year is 2002 or after, 0 otherwise. 
 CEORESID  Residual from a regression model where CEO compensation (salary, 
bonus or total compensation) is estimated using model (1).  
 
 
26Table 1  
Sample Selection 
 
 Firm-years  Firms 
Available observations in ExecuComp with CFO data (1993 – 2006)  16,933  2,604 
Less: CFO tenure less than 2 years  (5,134)  (306) 
Less: Missing I/B/E/S data  (614)  (57) 
Less: Missing ExecuComp data and observations with change in CEO  (1,668)  (96) 
Less: Missing Compustat data  (1,773)  (359) 






Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 









          
CFO Compensation       
COMP – Salary  321,041 131,983 225,000 297,000 386,870 
COMP – Bonus  218,744 339,639 34,067 131,000 278,566 
COMP – Total  1,361,713 1,282,955 515,090  904,617  1,672,148 
       
Job Complexity       
DIRECTOR  0.149 0.356  0  0  0 
GEOSEG  2.573 1.496  2  2  3 
BUSSEG  2.260 1.523  1  2  3 
FCF  0.092 0.220  -0.002  0.095 0.199 
ACQ  0.028 0.092  0  0  0 
DEBTISSUE  0.100 0.176  0  0.015 0.114 
STOCKSALE  0.027 0.062 0.002 0.008 0.021 
       
Overall Firm Performance       
ROA  0.045 0.086 0.020 0.049 0.086 
RET  0.187 0.660  -0.130  0.110 0.366 
       
CFO-Specific Performance       
NUMEST  10.368 7.426  5  8  14 
REVISION  -0.011 0.112 -0.010  -0.0005 0.003 
BEAT  0.662 0.473  0  1  1 
PDA  0.205 0.658  0  0.003 0.081 
NDA  0.142 0.472  0  0  0.061 
       
Control Variables       
SIZE (in millions)  3,298.080 5,421.427  426.652  1,077.342  3,111.664 
BTOM  0.484 0.374 0.259 0.423 0.621 
CEORESID – Salary  1.106 0.382 0.880 1.068 1.272 
CEORESID – Bonus  5.008 12.894 0.044 1.855  4.404 
CEORESID - Total  1.316 1.069 0.651 1.012 1.580 
 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions.  For easier interpretation, we present descriptive statistics 
using raw numbers for logged variables.  All variables are winsorized at one standard deviation. 
 Table 3 
Pearson and Spearman Correlations  














































DIRECTOR   -0.018  -0.053  -0.009 -0.010 -0.007  -0.020  0.048 -0.026  0.043  -0.006 -0.012  -0.032 0.042 0.014  0.070 -0.159  0.020 -0.014 0.004 
GEOSEG  -0.019    0.096  -0.024  0.037  -0.052 0.023 -0.026  0.006  0.074 -0.027  0.019  0.095 -0.053 0.062 -0.096 0.003 0.007  0.011  -0.018 
BUSSEG  -0.053 0.092   0.066  -0.003 -0.021  -0.103 -0.030  -0.023  -0.048  0.015  -0.027  0.015  0.023 0.275 0.045 0.125 -0.051  0.009  -0.032 
FCF  -0.019 -0.021  0.067   0.005  -0.077 -0.139 0.410 0.036  0.121  0.074  0.125 0.001  -0.039 0.179 -0.169 0.161  0.003 -0.018 0.027 
ACQ  -0.015  0.045  -0.007  0.043  0.308  0.112  -0.070  0.032  0.017 0.019  -0.002  0.013  -0.022 -0.069 -0.015  -0.048  0.003 -0.016 0.025 
DEBTISSUE  0.038  -0.044 0.062  -0.076  0.193   0.058  -0.073  0.015  -0.029  0.000  -0.052 -0.026 0.024 -0.042 0.023 -0.061  0.006 -0.012 0.017 
STOCKSALE  -0.097 0.071  -0.123  0.054  0.109  -0.142    -0.058  0.220  0.019  0.043  0.031  0.090 -0.045 -0.235 -0.160 -0.046  0.024  0.002  0.079 
ROA  0.023  0.004  -0.091 0.445  -0.049  -0.169  0.263    0.157 0.171  0.193  0.160  0.010  0.067 0.026 -0.268  -0.015 -0.016  -0.059  0.012 
RET  -0.028  -0.002 0.003  0.131  0.018 -0.007  0.206 0.226    -0.002  0.144  0.111  0.042 -0.035 -0.050 -0.260 -0.004  -0.023 -0.057  0.021 
NUMEST  0.040  0.077  -0.048  0.135 0.033 0.027  0.153  0.168 0.021   0.081  0.103  -0.018 0.011 0.548 -0.249 -0.050  0.064  -0.008  0.059 
REVISION  -0.029  -0.008 0.007  0.197  0.020  -0.056 0.229 0.403 0.447  0.130    0.074  -0.009 0.015 0.042 -0.104 0.033  -0.003  -0.030  0.008 
BEAT  -0.012 0.022  -0.027 0.145  0.018  -0.071 0.111 0.196 0.170  0.098  0.238    -0.002  -0.043  0.022  -0.141 0.061  -0.012  -0.060  0.001 
PDA  -0.009  0.092  0.016  -0.064  0.019 -0.010  0.069 0.104  0.008 -0.021  0.039  -0.018   0.094  -0.040  -0.081  0.107  0.003 -0.009 0.000 
NDA  -0.027  -0.001  -0.025 0.078  0.012  -0.038 0.046 -0.119  0.001 0.006  -0.028  0.032 -0.857    0.051 0.066 -0.190 -0.027  -0.000 -0.020 
SIZE  0.011  0.064 0.270  0.177  -0.074  0.166  -0.199  -0.076  0.012  0.559 0.070  0.022  -0.074  -0.000    -0.010  0.146 0.053  0.038  0.007 
BTOM  0.071  -0.104  0.101  -0.259 -0.035 0.081  -0.411  -0.458 -0.346  -0.263  -0.280  -0.154 -0.070 -0.027 0.019    -0.022  -0.034 0.047 -0.063 
SOXDUM  -0.159  0.010  0.125 0.173  -0.041  -0.096  0.126  -0.008  0.033 -0.045  0.117  0.061  -0.038  0.124  0.141  0.009    -0.015  0.106 -0.029 
CEORESID - 
Salary  0.008  0.029 -0.033  0.031  0.011 0.013  0.004  0.036 -0.036  0.087  -0.040  -0.016  0.024  -0.004  0.098 -0.051 -0.016   0.126  0.305 
CEORESID - 
Bonus  0.010 -0.000  -0.018  0.013  0.027  0.009 0.022 0.052  0.002  -0.032 0.133  -0.070  0.013 0.009 -0.018 0.030 -0.025  0.225    0.0177 
CEORESID - 
Total  -0.014 0.002  -0.007  0.056 0.033 -0.037 0.114  0.083 0.002  0.030 0.072  0.004  0.027  0.012 0.014 -0.091  0.014  0.408 0.343   
 
*See Appendix for variable definitions. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are shown at the top (bottom) of the table. 




Impact of Job Complexity and Performance on Measures of CFO Compensation 
 
Independent Hypothesized  COMP – Salaryt+1    COMP – Bonust    COMP – Totalt 
Variables
* Sign  Coefficient  p-value    Coefficient p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
Intercept    1.854  <0.01   1.323  <0.01   1.921  <0.01 
Job  Complexity                 
 DIRECTOR  +  0.052  <0.01   0.118  <0.01   0.061  <0.01 
 GEOSEG  +  -0.002  0.61   0.017  0.32   0.036  <0.01 
 BUSSEG  +  0.021  <0.01   0.189  <0.01   0.007  0.24 
 FCF  + 0.016  0.02    0.152  <0.01    0.046  <0.01 
 ACQ  + 0.010  0.26    0.362  <0.01    0.162  <0.01 
 DEBTISSUE  +  0.013  0.06   0.071  0.05   0.045  <0.01 
 STOCKSALE  + 0.128  <0.01    0.227  0.04    0.590  <0.01 
Overall Firm Performance                   
 ROA  + 0.038  0.03    1.468  <0.01    0.148  <0.01 
 RET  +  0.013  <0.01   0.134  <0.01   0.022  <0.01 
CFO-Specific  Performance                 
 NUMEST  +  -0.004  0.78   0.074  0.01   0.150  <0.01 
 REVISION  + -0.010  0.78    0.409  <0.01    0.040  0.04 
 BEAT  + 0.005  0.05    0.166  <0.01    0.036  <0.01 
 PDAxBEAT  + 0.005  0.02    0.054  <0.01    0.010  0.04 
 NDAxBEAT  + -0.001  0.63    0.092  <0.01    0.013  0.03 
Control  Variables                 
 SIZE    0.207  <0.01   0.276  <0.01   0.318  <0.01 
 BTOM    -0.017  <0.01   -0.189  <0.01   -0.111  <0.01 
 SOXDUM    0.057  <0.01   -0.085  <0.01   0.087  <0.01 
 CEORESID    0.222  <0.01   0.653  <0.01   0.472  <0.01 
Number of Observations   6,104    7,744   7,744 
Adjusted R
2   63.14%    56.97%   66.29% 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions.  A one-tailed (two-tailed) p-value is reported for all test (control) variables. 
*  industry fixed effects are not reported. 
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Contemporaneous Impact of Job Complexity and Performance on CFO Salary 
(n = 7,744) 
 
 
Independent Hypothesized  COMP – Salaryt 
Variables
* Sign  Coefficient  p-value 
Intercept   1.853  <0.01 
Job Complexity       
 DIRECTOR  + 0.066  <0.01 
 GEOSEG  + -0.002  0.66 
 BUSSEG  + 0.026  <0.01 
 FCF  + 0.019  <0.01 
 ACQ  + -0.004  0.77 
 DEBTISSUE  + 0.005  0.42 
 STOCKSALE  + 0.088  <0.01 
Overall Firm Performance       
 ROA  + -0.009  0.57 
 RET  + 0.005  <0.01 
CFO-Specific Performance       
 NUMEST  + -0.018  <0.01 
 REVISION  + -0.009  0.36 
 BEAT  + -0.003  0.28 
 PDAxBEAT  + 0.003  0.11 
 NDAxBEAT  + -0.002  0.57 
Control Variables       
 SIZE   0.211  <0.01 
 BTOM   -0.019  <0.01 
 SOXDUM   0.067  <0.01 
 CEORESID   0.239  <0.01 
Number of Observations   7,744 
Adjusted R
2   69.82% 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions.  A one-tailed (two-tailed) p-value is reported for all test (control) variables. 
*  industry fixed effects are not reported. 
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